A threshold signature scheme (TSS) distributes signing authority across the members of a signing group. Infinity Solvers and the Attester Network are separate signing groups. For a signing group with n members and threshold t, at least t valid participants are required for signing. The actual values come from the deployment’s configuration for each signing group.

Authorization boundaries

Infinity Solvers and the Attester Network use separate identities and key material. The engine derives operation digests. The threshold signing daemon holds key shares. A failed derivation, confirmation timeout, or missing response refuses the signing request.

Client validation

  1. Pin trusted chain identifiers and deployment addresses in application configuration.
  2. Check the paying account and recipient against the user’s request.
  3. Check assets, amounts, deadlines, and slippage allocations.
  4. Check every approval target and transaction destination.
  5. Validate the full signing payload before requesting a wallet signature.
Do not derive signing trust solely from the same Infinity Hub response that supplies the executable payload. The catalog provides discovery data. It is not an independent trust anchor.

Security assumptions

TSS protects against signing by fewer than the configured threshold under the signature scheme’s assumptions. A compromised signing threshold can authorize operations under that signing group’s key. Threshold signing does not establish that an event occurred on chain. Attester validation and chain finality checks supply that evidence. Contract correctness, trustworthy chain observations, key-share protection, and the availability of Infinity Solvers and the Attester Network remain necessary. The protocol does not inherit IBC light-client verification merely because a route includes c8ntinuum. See settlement security for attestation-specific assumptions.